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Mass exploitation of critical MOVEit flaw is ransacking orgs big and small

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Organizations big and small are falling prey to the mass exploitation of a critical vulnerability in a widely used file-transfer program. The exploitation started over the Memorial Day holiday—while the critical vulnerability was still a zeroday—and continues now, some nine days later.

As of Monday evening, payroll service Zellis, the Canadian province of Nova Scotia, British Airways, the BBC, and UK retailer Boots were all known to have had data stolen through the attacks, which are fueled by a recently patched vulnerability in MOVEit, a file-transfer provider that offers both cloud and on-premises services. Both Nova Scotia and Zellis had their own instances or cloud services breached. British Airways, the BBC, and Boots were customers of Zellis. All of the hacking activity has been attributed to the Russian-speaking Clop crime syndicate.

Widespread and rather substantial

Despite the relatively small number of confirmed breaches, researchers monitoring the ongoing attacks are describing the exploitation as widespread. They liken the hacks to smash-and-grab robberies, in which a window is broken and thieves grab whatever they can, and warned that the quick-moving heists are hitting banks, government agencies, and other targets in alarmingly high numbers.

“We have a handful of customers that were running MOVEit Transfer open to the Internet, and they were all compromised,” Steven Adair, president of security firm Volexity, wrote in an email. “Other folks we have talked to have seen similar.”

Adair continued:

I do not want to categorize our customers at this point since I do not know what all is out there in terms of who is running the software and give them away. With that said, though—it’s both massive and small organizations that have been hit. The cases we have looked into have all involved some level of data exfiltration. The attackers typically grabbed files from the MOVEit servers less than two hours after exploitation and shell access. We believe this was likely widespread and a rather substantial number of MOVEit Transfer servers that were running Internet-facing web services were compromised.

Caitlin Condon, a senior manager of security research who leads the research arm of security firm Rapid7, said normally her team reserves the term “widespread threat” for events involving “many attackers, many targets.” The attacks under way have neither. So far there’s only one known attacker: Clop, a Russian-speaking group that’s among the most prolific and active ransomware actors. And with the Shodan search engine indexing just 2,510 Internet-facing MOVEit instances when the attacks began, it’s fair to say there aren’t “many targets,” relatively speaking.

In this case, however, Rapid7 is making an exception.

“We aren’t seeing commodity threat actors or low-skill attackers throwing exploits here, but the exploitation of available high-value targets globally across a wide range of org sizes, verticals, and geo-locations tips the scale for us on classifying this as a widespread threat,” she explained in a text message.

She noted that Monday was only the only third business day since the incident became widely known and many victims may only now be learning they were compromised. “We expect to see a longer list of victims come out as time goes on, particularly as regulatory requirements for reporting come into play,” she wrote.

Independent researcher Kevin Beaumont, meanwhile, said on social media on Sunday night: “I’ve been tracking this—there are a double-digit number of orgs who had data stolen, that includes multiple US Government and banking orgs.”

The MOVEit vulnerability stems from a security flaw that allows for SQL injection, one of the oldest and most common classes of exploit. Often abbreviated as SQLi, these vulnerabilities usually stem from a failure by a Web application to adequately scrub search queries and other user input of characters that an app might consider a command. By entering specially crafted strings into vulnerable website fields, attackers can trick a Web app into returning confidential data, giving administrative system privileges, or subverting the way the app works.

Timeline

According to a post published by security firm Mandiant on Monday, the first signs of the Clop exploitation spree occurred on May 27. In some cases data theft occurred within minutes of the installation of a custom webshell tracked as LemurLoot, the researchers said. They added:

Mandiant is aware of multiple cases where large volumes of files have been stolen from victims’ MOVEit transfer systems. LEMURLOOT can also steal Azure Storage Blob information, including credentials, from the MOVEit Transfer application settings, suggesting that actors exploiting this vulnerability may be stealing files from Azure in cases where victims are storing appliance data in Azure Blob storage, although it is unclear if theft is limited to data stored in this way.

The webshell is disguised with filenames such as “human2.aspx” and “human2.aspx.lnk” in an attempt to masquerade as human.aspx, a legitimate component of the MOVEit Transfer service. Mandiant also said it has “observed several POST requests made to the legitimate guestaccess.aspx file before interaction with the LEMURLOOT webshell, indicating SQLi attacks were directed towards that file.”

On May 31, four days after the earliest attacks began, MOVEit provider Progress patched the vulnerability. Within a day, social media posts surfaced reporting that the vulnerability was under exploit by a threat actor who was installing a file named human2.aspx in the root directory of vulnerable servers. Security firms soon confirmed the reports.

Formal attribution that Clop is behind the attacks came on Sunday from Microsoft, which linked the attacks to “Lace Tempest,” the name that company researchers use to track a ransomware operation that maintains the extortion website for the Clop ransomware group. Mandiant, meanwhile, found that tactics, techniques, and procedures used in the attack matched those of a group tracked as FIN11, which has deployed Clop ransomware in the past.

Clop is the same threat actor that mass exploited CVE-2023-0669, a critical vulnerability in a different file-transfer service known as GoAnywhere. That hacking spree allowed Clop to fell data security company Rubrik, obtain health information for one million patients from one of the biggest hospital chains, and (according to Bleeping Computer) take credit for hacking 130 organizations. Research from security firm Huntress has also confirmed that the malware used in intrusions exploiting CVE-2023-0669 had indirect ties to Clop.

So far, there are no known reports of victims receiving ransom demands. The Clop extortion site has also made no mention so far of the attacks. “If the goal of this operation is extortion,” researchers from Mandiant wrote, “we anticipate that victim organizations could receive extortion emails in the coming days to weeks.”

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3 iOS 0-days, a cellular network compromise, and HTTP used to infect an iPhone

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Apple has patched a potent chain of iOS zero-days that were used to infect the iPhone of an Egyptian presidential candidate with sophisticated spyware developed by a commercial exploit seller, Google and researchers from Citizen Lab said Friday.

The previously unknown vulnerabilities, which Apple patched on Thursday, were exploited in clickless attacks, meaning they didn’t require a target to take any steps other than to visit a website that used the HTTP protocol rather than the safer HTTPS alternative. A packet inspection device sitting on a cellular network in Egypt kept an eye out for connections from the phone of the targeted candidate and, when spotted, redirected it to a site that delivered the exploit chain, according to Citizen Lab, a research group at the University of Toronto’s Munk School.

A cast of villains, 3 0-days, and a compromised cell network

Citizen Lab said the attack was made possible by participation from the Egyptian government, spyware known as Predator sold by a company known as Cytrox, and hardware sold by Egypt-based Sandvine. The campaign targeted Ahmed Eltantawy, a former member of the Egyptian Parliament who announced he was running for president in March. Citizen Lab said the recent attacks were at least the third time Eltantawy’s iPhone has been attacked. One of them, in 2021, was successful and also installed Predator.

“The use of mercenary spyware to target a senior member of a country’s democratic opposition after they had announced their intention to run for president is a clear interference in free and fair elections and violates the rights to freedom of expression, assembly, and privacy,” Citizen Lab researchers Bill Marczak, John Scott-Railton, Daniel Roethlisberger, Bahr Abdul Razzak, Siena Anstis, and Ron Deibert wrote in a 4,200-word report. “It also directly contradicts how mercenary spyware firms publicly justify their sales.”

The vulnerabilities, which are patched in iOS versions 16.7 and iOS 17.0.1, are tracked as:

  • CVE-2023-41993: Initial remote code execution in Safari
  • CVE-2023-41991: PAC bypass
  • CVE-2023-41992: Local privilege escalation in the XNU Kernel

According to research published Friday by members of Google’s Threat Analysis Group, the attackers who exploited the iOS vulnerabilities also had a separate exploit for installing the same Predator spyware on Android devices. Google patched the flaws on September 5 after receiving a report by a research group calling itself DarkNavy.

“TAG observed these exploits delivered in two different ways: the MITM injection and via one-time links sent directly to the target,” Maddie Stone, a researcher with the Google Threat Analysis Group wrote. “We were only able to obtain the initial renderer remote code execution vulnerability for Chrome, which was exploiting CVE-2023-4762.”

The attack was complex. Besides leveraging three separate iOS vulnerabilities, it also relied on hardware made by a manufacturer known as Sandvine. Sold under the brand umbrella PacketLogic, the hardware sat on the cellular network the targeted iPhone accessed and monitored traffic passing over it for his phone. Despite the precision, Citizen Lab said that the attack is blocked when users turn on a feature known as Lockdown, which Apple added to iOS last year. More about that later.

There’s little information about the iOS exploit chain other than it automatically triggered when a target visited a site hosting the malicious code. Once there, the exploits installed Predator with no further user action required.

To surreptitiously direct the iPhone to the attack site, it only needed to visit any HTTP site. Over the past five years or so, HTTPS has become the dominant means of connecting to websites because the encryption it uses prevents adversary-in-the-middle attackers from monitoring or manipulating data sent between the site and the visitor. HTTP sites still exist, and sometimes HTTPS connections can be downgraded to unencrypted HTTP ones.

Once Eltantawy visited an HTTP site, the PacketLogic device injected data into the traffic that surreptitiously connected the Apple device to a site that triggered the exploit chain.

Network diagram showing the Spyware Injection Middlebox located on a link between Telecom Egypt and Vodafone Egypt.
Enlarge / Network diagram showing the Spyware Injection Middlebox located on a link between Telecom Egypt and Vodafone Egypt.

Predator, the payload installed in the attack, is sold to a wide array of governments, including those of Armenia, Egypt, Greece, Indonesia, Madagascar, Oman, Saudi Arabia, and Serbia. Citizen Lab has said that Predator was used to target Ayman Nour, a member of the Egyptian political opposition living in exile in Turkey, and an Egyptian exiled journalist who hosts a popular news program and wishes to remain anonymous. Last year researchers from Cisco’s Talo security team exposed the inner workings of the malware after obtaining a binary of it.

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Incomplete disclosures by Apple and Google create “huge blindspot” for 0-day hunters

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Incomplete information included in recent disclosures by Apple and Google reporting critical zero-day vulnerabilities under active exploitation in their products has created a “huge blindspot” that’s causing a large number of offerings from other developers to go unpatched, researchers said Thursday.

Two weeks ago, Apple reported that threat actors were actively exploiting a critical vulnerability in iOS so they could install espionage spyware known as Pegasus. The attacks used a zero-click method, meaning they required no interaction on the part of targets. Simply receiving a call or text on an iPhone was enough to become infected by the Pegasus, which is among the world’s most advanced pieces of known malware.

“Huge blindspot”

Apple said the vulnerability, tracked as CVE-2023-41064, stemmed from a buffer overflow bug in ImageIO, a proprietary framework that allows applications to read and write most image file formats, which include one known as WebP. Apple credited the discovery of the zero-day to Citizen Lab, a research group at the University of Toronto’s Munk School that follows attacks by nation-states targeting dissidents and other at-risk groups.

Four days later, Google reported a critical vulnerability in its Chrome browser. The company said the vulnerability was what’s known as a heap buffer overflow that was present in WebP. Google went on to warn that an exploit for the vulnerability existed in the wild. Google said that the vulnerability, designated as CVE-2023-4863, was reported by the Apple Security Engineering and Architecture team and Citizen Lab.

Speculation, including from me, quickly arose that a large number of similarities strongly suggested that the underlying bug for both vulnerabilities was the same. On Thursday, researchers from security firm Rezillion published evidence that they said made it “highly likely” both indeed stemmed from the same bug, specifically in libwebp, the code library that apps, operating systems, and other code libraries incorporate to process WebP images.

Rather than Apple, Google, and Citizen Lab coordinating and accurately reporting the common origin of the vulnerability, they chose to use a separate CVE designation, the researchers said. The researchers concluded that “millions of different applications” would remain vulnerable until they, too, incorporated the libwebp fix. That, in turn, they said, was preventing automated systems developers use to track known vulnerabilities in their offerings from detecting a critical vulnerability that’s under active exploitation.

“Since the vulnerability is scoped under the overarching product containing the vulnerable dependency, the vulnerability will only be flagged by vulnerability scanners for these specific products,” Rezillion researchers Ofri Ouzan and Yotam Perkal wrote. “This creates a HUGE blindspot for organizations blindly relying on the output of their vulnerability scanner.”

Google has further come under criticism for limiting the scope of CVE-2023-4863 to Chrome rather than in libwebp. Further, the official description describes the vulnerability as a heap buffer overflow in WebP in Google Chrome.

In an email, a Google representative wrote: “Many platforms implement WebP differently. We do not have any details about how the bug impacts other products. Our focus was getting a fix out to the Chromium community and affected Chromium users as soon as possible. It is best practice for software products to track upstream libraries they depend on in order to pick up security fixes and improvements.”

The representative noted that the WebP image format is mentioned in its disclosure and the official CVE page. The representative didn’t explain why the official CVE and Google’s disclosure did not mention the widely used libwebp library or the likelihood that other software was also likely to be vulnerable.

The Google representative didn’t answer a question asking if CVE-2023-4863 and CVE-2023-41064 stemmed from the same vulnerability. Citizen Lab and Apple didn’t respond to emailed questions before this story went live.

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Signal preps its encryption engine for the quantum doomsday inevitability

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The Signal Foundation, maker of the Signal Protocol that encrypts messages sent by more than a billion people, has rolled out an update designed to prepare for a very real prospect that’s never far from the thoughts of just about every security engineer on the planet: the catastrophic fall of cryptographic protocols that secure some of the most sensitive secrets today.

The Signal Protocol is a key ingredient in the Signal, Google RCS, and WhatsApp messengers, which collectively have more than 1 billion users. It’s the engine that provides end-to-end encryption, meaning messages encrypted with the apps can be decrypted only by the recipients and no one else, including the platforms enabling the service. Until now, the Signal Protocol encrypted messages and voice calls with X3DH, a specification based on a form of cryptography known as Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman.

A brief detour: WTF is ECDH?

Often abbreviated as ECDH, Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman is a protocol unto its own. It combines two main building blocks. The first part involves the use of elliptic curves to form asymmetric key pairs, each of which is unique to each user. One key in the pair is public and available to anyone to use for encrypting messages sent to the person who owns it. The corresponding private key is closely guarded by the user. It allows the user to decrypt the messages. Cryptography relying on a public-private key pair is often known as asymmetric encryption.

The security of asymmetric encryption is based on mathematical one-way functions. Also known as trapdoor functions, these problems are easy to compute in one direction and substantially harder to compute in reverse. In elliptic curve cryptography, this one-way function is based on the Discrete Logarithm problem in mathematics. The key parameters are based on specific points in an elliptic curve, which is defined as the field of integers modulo prime P.

When someone knows the starting point (A) in the above image showing an elliptic curve and the number of hops required to get to the endpoint (E), it’s easy to know where (E) is. But when all someone knows is the starting and end points, it’s next to impossible to deduce how many hops are required.

As explained in an Ars article from 2013:

Let’s imagine this curve as the setting for a bizarre game of billiards. Take any two points on the curve and draw a line through them; the line will intersect the curve at exactly one more place. In this game of billiards, you take a ball at point A and shoot it toward point B. When it hits the curve, the ball bounces either straight up (if it’s below the x-axis) or straight down (if it’s above the x-axis) to the other side of the curve.

We can call this billiards move on two points “dot.” Any two points on a curve can be dotted together to get a new point.

A dot B = C

We can also string moves together to “dot” a point with itself over and over.

A dot A = B

A dot B = C

A dot C = D

It turns out that if you have two points, an initial point “dotted” with itself n times to arrive at a final point, finding out n when you only know the final point and the first point is hard. To continue our bizarro billiards metaphor, imagine that one person plays our game alone in a room for a random period of time. It is easy for him to hit the ball over and over following the rules described above. If someone walks into the room later and sees where the ball has ended up, even if they know all the rules of the game and where the ball started, they cannot determine the number of times the ball was struck to get there without running through the whole game again until the ball gets to the same point. Easy to do, hard to undo. This is the basis for a very good trapdoor function.

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